http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.4382
The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of these arguments cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance in Bayesian reasoning and explains away these puzzles.
Y. Benetreau-Dupin
Tue, 16 Dec 14
27/78
Comments: 15 pages, 1 figure. To appear in Philosophy of Science (PSA 2014)
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